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Abstract
This paper discusses the importance of institutional barriers in promoting reforestation as a
means of mitigating global climate change. It is argued that cost-effective implementation of
reforestation depends on proper institutional settings in host countries. The study is
motivated by the growing interest for reforestation projects in developing countries through
the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism. Particular emphasis is given to the role of property
rights. The relationship between various stakeholders, such as governments, NGOs, the
private sector, and international aid agencies is analyzed. Discussed aspects include conflicts
among stakeholders, long-term security or stability of property rights regimes, distribution of
property rights, and information exchange. The forest situation in China and Indonesia is
used as an illustrative example.
The study outlines a number of conflicts in the property rights regime which need a better
understanding. Important questions for further research include: (1) What are the underlying
conditions that affect the design and implementation of reforestation programs? (2) Who are
the main actors involved in forest management, and which are their respective roles and
motivations? (3) To what extent and in what ways do property rights affect the cost-
effectiveness of reforestation efforts? (4) What policy instruments can be developed or
improved to facilitate reforestation programs? and (5) What are the relevant institutional
frameworks and/or arrangements to be used in JI for reforestation programs? What
institutional changes would be brought up through such programs?
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1 Introduction
Reforestation is a priority issue in the policy agenda in both developed and developing
countries. This issue is particular relevant to developing countries, due to their faster rates of
deforestation (Allan and Lanly, 1991, p.30). Nested within the debates surrounding global
climate change, reforestation is emerging as both a promising and controversial solution.
Optimists view reforestation as a cost-efficient strategy to sequester CO2 and mitigate
climate change (Brown, 1996, pp.775-76). It is therefore seen as an interesting option for
countries seeking ways of fulfilling their obligations to the Kyoto protocol of the Climate
Convention (UNFCCC). The Kyoto protocol may open for crediting of carbon benefits of
projects in other countries through "Joint Implementation" (JI) and mechanisms such as the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
Reforestation in developing countries is seen as particularly attractive, due to high tree
growth rates and low costs compared to similar measures at higher latitudes (Brown, op.cit.,
pp.787-89). Reforestation has also been proposed as a means of offsetting high rates of
deforestation in tropical countries. Nevertheless, critics question the long-term CO2 benefits
of reforestation, and argue that such efforts may give negative environmental and socio-
economic impacts.1
Consequently, reforestation has become entangled in debates about climate change
mitigation strategies and carbon accounting methodologies. While the Kyoto protocol may
lead to increasing demand for carbon sequestration in the years to come, few studies have
explored the institutional implications of reforestation projects in developing countries.
Furthermore, the significance of these institutional factors has seldom been considered in
relation to the diverse stakeholders involved, which can be expected to have very different
interests related to reforestation. Examples of stakeholders are local communities,
landowners, pulp and paper companies, conservationists, national governments, international
investors, international aid agencies, and climate change research institutions.
In this paper, we first present some background on reforestation, climate change and Joint
Implementation (Chapter 2). We then discuss what we consider a "missing link" in studies
on reforestation projects, namely institutional aspects (Chapter 3 and 4). The discussion is
focused on the extent and means property rights affect implementation and long-term
success of reforestation efforts2,3. Four aspects are emphasized: (1) emergent conflicts
among various stakeholder groups, (2) long-term security or stability of property rights
regimes, (3) distribution of property rights, and (4) information exchange. These issues are
                                                       
1
 Large-scale plantations in particular are met by scepticism. Such plantations could sequester large amounts
of carbon over a short time period, and be very profitable for the investor. However, technical risks are great,
and social resistance is often high and the environmental soundness is generally low. Using these in a joint
implementation project may, in fact, contradict the objectives of the Climate Convention.
2
 The aim is to reveal any "hidden costs" arising from the property rights regime in carbon sequestration
projects. Property rights could affect establishment and maintenance costs, i.e., both at short-term and long-
term costs.
3
 "Success" can be defined according to several criteria, including financial viability for the actors involved,
social acceptability, and environmental sustainability. It is important to note that success for the donor
country does not necessarily equate with success in the host country.
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considered critical in evaluating the potential of reforestation as a mitigation measure for
climate change.
In Chapter 5, China and Indonesia are presented as illustrative case studies. Despite
differences in their political and socio-economic systems, the two countries share several
common features in their development. First, they are both countries with large land areas
suitable for reforestation, thus a large potential for carbon sequestration. Second, they both
have centralized government control and bureaucratic systems and relatively marginal
private ownership over lands. Third, both countries have already initiated ambitious
programs for reforestation.
The main objective of these programs is to secure future supplies of forest resources in a
situation with declining natural forest areas, but also to increase agricultural productivity,
e.g., through agroforestry practice, protect watersheds, control soil erosion and reduce
desertification. In the conclusion, main issues and questions for future research are
presented.
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2 Reforestation, Climate Change and Joint
Implementation
2.1 Reforestation and Climate Change
Reforestation could mitigate human-induced climate change through carbon sequestration,
i.e. uptake of CO2 and storage of carbon in biomass, soils and wood products. The term
reforestation normally describes the establishment of forests on lands that have been cleared
in recent times.
When forests are established on what was previously non-forested land, the term
afforestation is more appropriate. FAO (1997) defines afforestation as "the establishment of
a tree crop on an area from which it has always or very long been absent.” While
reforestation in some areas, e.g. parts of China, is technically considered afforestation, in this
paper we use the term reforestation because our emphasis is on tropical forests that have
been cleared in recent times.
Reforestation covers a variety of forest types, ranging from monoculture forest plantations
to highly diverse and complex agroforestry systems. Methods for reforestation involve both
planting and natural regeneration. It is assumed that natural regeneration of secondary
forests over time would sequester most of the carbon dioxide that was released in the
deforestation process. However, this process may require a century or more. Planting of
fast-growing tree species could be one way of accelerating the carbon uptake of forests.
Studies vary as to how much carbon could be sequestered and over how long time. Based on
two global studies (Nilsson and Schopfhauser, 1995; Trexler and Haugen, 1995), Brown
(1996) estimates the total potential for conserving and sequestration carbon at between 60
and 87 GtC for the period 1995-2050. This is equivalent to about 12-15 % of total fossil fuel
emissions over the same period in a "business as usual" scenario. Measures include slowed
deforestation, forestation, agroforestry, and natural and assisted regeneration. This estimate
assumes an area availability of 700 Mha. Forestation (includes both afforestation and
reforestation) account for about 42% of the total (31 GtC).
2.2 Reforestation and Joint Implementation
In recent years, many countries have developed an interest in supporting reforestation
programs, including programs outside of their countries. This interest is based on the
premise that it would be cheaper to sequestrate carbon in other countries than to reduce
emissions by direct national actions, assuming that it is possible to obtain credit for such
projects.
The mechanism for transferring  emissions reduction credits between countries is through
Joint Implementation (JI). The principle of JI originated in the 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which states that "Parties may
implement … policies and measures jointly with other Parties". The JI approach is based on
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the premise that countries with high emission reduction costs (typically industrialized
countries) may invest in GHG-reducing efforts in low-cost countries (typically developing
countries), thereby obtaining credits for achieved emissions reductions.
There is considerable discussion both about JI as an implementation mechanism and its
applicability to reforestation in tropical countries. Under the FCCC negotiations, a pilot
phase for JI efforts is now in progress (1995-1999). JI projects under the pilot phase are
officially referred to as Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ). AIJ projects in the forest sector
are being implemented in countries, such as Costa Rica, Mexico, Russia, and Indonesia. The
future development of JI will, to a large extent, depend on the experiences of AIJ during the
pilot phase.
The future of JI was not fully addressed at the third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) held
in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997. The Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Convention may
provide opportunities for crediting carbon offsets through the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). The CDM will enable companies in the developed world to enter into
cooperative projects to reduce emissions in the developing world, e.g., reforestation or the
construction of high-tech, environmentally sound power plants, for the benefit of both
parties. Companies will thus be able to reduce emissions at lower costs than they could at
home, while developing countries will be able to receive the kind of technology that can
allow them to pursue sustainable growth.
The CDM will certify and score projects, and also allow developing countries to bring
projects forward in circumstances where there is no immediate developed country partner.
Under this mechanism, companies may choose to either make investments in projects or to
buy emissions reductions.
JI has been largely promoted by industrialized countries in order to reduce the overall costs
of carbon mitigation in their own countries. From the perspective of developing countries,
motivating factors for reforestation include opportunities for attracting private sector funds,
facilitating technology transfer and other social and environmental benefits (Chatterjee,
1997, p.81). Countries in favor of JI argue that, in addition to being a vehicle to promote
cost-effective GHG reductions, JI could have a number of ’spin-off’ effects:
1) push for stronger future commitments for Annex I countries;4
2) create incentives for the involvement of the private sector in dissemination and
application of appropriate technologies;
3) help developing countries being more actively involved in the implementation of the
Climate Convention; and
4) provide incentives for additional investment flows into developing countries.
Although JI is still in a pilot phase, its role as a strategy for addressing climate change has
come under extensive criticism (Harvey and Bush, 1997, p.17). JI has been met with
considerable skepticism mainly, but not exclusively, from developing countries. Critics argue
that JI could be a way for industrialized countries to "buy their way out" of emission
reductions. Furthermore, it could be a negative incentive for technology development, for
example, to replace existing fossil fuel technologies. Industries from the power sector are
                                                       
4 Countries listed in Annex I to the Convention include industrialised countries and countries with
economies in transition (EIT).
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pushing carbon sequestration as the CO2 mitigation strategy of choice. The reality is that
carbon sink enhancement will do little to tackle the root causes of either climate change or
global deforestation.
As a solution to climate change, carbon forestry is not the equivalent of cutting the
consumption of fossil fuels. First, carbon sequestration will not reduce the emission of other
atmospheric pollutants such as those that cause acid rain. Second, carbon sequestration is
more difficult to measure than emissions cuts. Third, carbon storage is only temporary if the
forest is harvested. Finally, plantation forestry, the cheapest way to reduce CO2 levels, is
harmful to biodiversity and indigenous peoples who depend on natural forests.
The success of JI ultimately depends on the creation of appropriate and rigorous criteria that
will ensure the maximum environment, development and social benefits, while remaining
attractive to investors and implementers. To resolve ambiguities related to the concept,
several criteria have been established for reforestation programs for carbon sequestration.
Criteria that are common to most programs are: 1) additionality, e.g., many forestry
programs cannot be established without external financial support; 2) social acceptability
that fits into local needs; 3) economic viability, and 4) ecological sustainability. For
reforestation projects in particular, there is a need for considering how long-term social and
environmental benefits could be secured.
2.3 Current research on JI/AIJ
Scientific understanding of the implementation mechanisms for JI/AIJ is still limited. We
know little about the dynamic forces that drive the development and implementation of
JI/AIJ. Currently, international trade in GHG has drawn major attention, with research
focusing on baseline and methodological issues as to how to quantify greenhouse gas offsets
through JI/AIJ projects. Issues related to quantification, certification and verification of
GHG offsets have been studied, particularly on sectoral issues at the project level
(Chatterjee, 1997 and  Michaelowa, 1997).
Specific methodological issues include criteria for project selection and assessment, as
pointed out by Karani (1997, p.247):
• Credibility of the additionality of GHG emissions reduction from the project.
• Number of GHG sources and sinks to be reported.
• Adequacy of arrangements for monitoring, assessing and evaluating GHG emissions
reductions.
• Facilitation of realistic discussions on pricing and distribution of implicit credits.
• Adequacy of assessment of project risks and measures to address negative outcomes.
Financial arrangements and mechanisms for JI have also been emphasized. Embree (1996)
describes the potential role project financing will play in the JI market. The paper identifies
several financial mechanisms that can facilitate the financing of JI projects and contribute to
risk management of JI investments. Michaelowa and Greiner (1996, pp.231-252) discuss the
complications that arise when designing JI incentives for companies at the national level. Not
only should focus be put on the efficiency of incentive structures, but, they point out, issues
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in public choice should also be taken into account. This mostly refers to the roles of different
interest groups, particularly NGOs.
It was stressed in Parikh (1995, pp.22-41) that although JI can be beneficial to both the
investing country and host country participants, care should be taken that projects are set up
in line with the development priorities of the host countries. An interesting point in the
article is the distinction between the trade mode and the benevolent assistance mode of co-
operation between investor and host countries. The first mode reflects a situation where
investor pays a market equilibrium price, which is higher than the ‘fully agreed incremental
costs’. In return, the investor receives carbon offsets (credits). Examples of second mode
projects are the GEF projects, where costs are paid equal to the incremental costs, but no
offsets are expected in return.
Apart from the attention to technical and methodological issues in JI/AIJ research, studies of
social and economic impacts of JI projects have received considerable attention, such as
displacement from impoundment areas or enclosure of reforested areas. These impacts are
particularly severe in the forest sector with afforestation or reforestation projects (Cullet and
Kameri-Mbote, 1997, pp.394-397). This is an important dimension, releasing the potential
impacts of AI/AIJ projects to local communities and people.
Impact assessment of JI/AIJ is considered an important dimension. However, the dynamics
of social and human factors in shaping the design and implementation of JI/AIJ projects have
been, to a large extent, ignored. Zhou, Li and Intarapravich (1995) discuss options for
developing institutions for JI projects. The evaluation is based on four sets of governmental
and international criteria for JI projects, and the experience of ten JI pilot projects.
What is less emphasized is factors that condition the behavior of stakeholders. For example,
the factors that drive private sector’s interest and its involvement in JI/AIJ activities should
be better understood. We also need to understand the mechanisms through which closer co-
operation could be made between parties and local participants. It is expected that there are
uncertainties in policy incentives provided by host developing countries, which undermine
cost-effective project implementation. Therefore, qualitative analysis of institutional
conditions for JI/AIJ activities at host countries present a great challenge for researchers.
Several initiatives are underway at the national and international levels to test the credibility
of JI/AIJ. In 1996, the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy undertook
a research on Institutions and Procedures to Implement JI. The Twin Cycle System approach
was used in the study. The role of national institutions as intermediary bodies is examined.
Activities that absorb carbon, such as planting trees, will be offset against emissions targets.
The treatment of these so-called "sinks" was another controversial issue at Kyoto
conference. Many countries wanted sinks to be excluded. The United States insisted that
they be included in the interest of encouraging activities like afforestation and reforestation.
Accounting for the role of forests is critical to a comprehensive and environmentally
responsible approach to climate change. It also provides the private sector with low-cost
opportunities to reduce emissions.
In 1997, the EU started a research project on accounting and accreditation of JI projects
under the UNFCCC and the Oslo Protocol. The objective of the study is to examine the
concept of JI as an instrument to the fair and efficient abatement of GHGs. It focuses on
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economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness, social impacts, institutional feasibility, and
intertemporal equity. The focus is on accounting for emissions reduction under a
counterfactual baseline, and the complexities associated with assigning credit to donor
countries.
While discussions of emissions trading, joint implementation and clean development
mechanisms are central to establishing future relationships between reforestation and climate
change, it is the implementation of such projects that is critical to determining its future role
in climate change mitigation. While much attention has been given to the technical, economic
and ecological aspects of reforestation programs, we argue, the institutional aspects
represent a missing link in climate change mitigation debates.
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3 Institutional Dynamics: The Missing Link
There is an inadequate understanding of JI/AIJ as a social institution related to climate
change mitigation strategies. Two distinct factors may explain the lack of focus on
institutional aspects. First, global environmental research has been largely defined by natural
scientists. This is evident in a number of international programs, including the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Geosphere
Biosphere Program (IGBP). Such programs tend to emphasize data collection and
quantitative analysis, modelling and technology assessment (TA). Meanwhile, inadequate
attention has been given to the underlying social, political, cultural and institutional factors
that condition natural phenomena and decision-making processes.5
In fact, it has only been in the last several years that social scientists, particularly political
scientists, economists, geographers, and to a lesser extent, scholars from the humanities and
law, have developed a research agenda related to the human dimension of global
environmental problems and policies.6 These research initiatives attempt to bridge the gap in
the social understanding of the dynamics of the human response to global environmental
problems and policymaking.
Second, there is a structural constraint in the social study of global environmental issues.
Too often, researchers are restricted by their disciplinary boundaries, or by webs of their
knowledge structures (Price, 1992, pp.178-79). Research on human dimension is dominated
by specialists within individual disciplines, such as political scientists, sociologists,
anthropologists, etc. This disciplinary orientation has produced limited efforts to look into
roles and dynamics of institutions in development from an interdisciplinary perspective.
Consequently, the dynamic of international and national institutions for the global
environment has been less studied than questions related to international development
assistance and North-South co-operation.
As a consequence of these two factors, knowledge on the discourse of global environmental
institutions is still limited and inadequate. We know little about the preconditions and
determinants that shape the behavior and policymaking processes of governmental
institutions and international aid agencies. In particular, there is insufficient understanding
about the causes of interaction and conflicting interests among institutions, because of their
differences in political priorities, sectoral interests, economic preferences, and power
relations. To address to this challenge, there is a need to cross-disciplinary boundaries and
develop alternative tools of analysis.
                                                       
5
 It is important to note that the Working Group III of the IPCC has devoted considerable attention to the
social and institutional issues that shape the global environmental problems.
6
 The importance of the social science understanding of institutions is stressed by Haas et al. (1993, p.viiii)
in their book "Institutions for the Earth": Social science should have a role to play in answering these
questions. Yet most scholarly analysis of international environmental policy has understated the institutional
dimensions. Policy content has been stressed at the expense of policy process, and little or no systematic
attention has been paid to the international institutions that must shape that process.
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4 Analytical Framework
Institutional factors provide both incentives and obstacles to the successful implementation
of reforestation programs. Factors that need to be considered include property rights, state
capacity, and the distributional consequences of reforestation efforts. We are particularly
interested in the underlying institutional issues involved in the complex interplay of
environmental and resource politics, forest management, economic dynamics, technology
innovation, financial and legal systems.
What needs to be better understood is how the issue of forest management is perceived and
operated at the national, regional and local levels, and in what ways international institutions
and financial transfer mechanisms can be cost-effectively linked to national, regional and
local systems of forest management. Would bottom-up approach in project implementation
be more effective than top-down approach, or vice versa? Through what ways can private
interest in the forest sector be better mobilized, which may be in consistence with public
interest?
There is an inadequate understanding of the driving forces and key actors that shape
reforestation policies in developing countries. Given the variations in traditions, cultures,
economic and political conditions, prescribed models of reforestation from industrialized
countries may not be relevant for developing countries.
It can be argued that within the context of reforestation programs, potential conflicts exist at
a variety of levels. They include: (1) conflicts of property rights (public vs. private), (2)
conflicts of interest (international, national, regional, sectoral and individual); (3) conflicts of
market (supply vs. demand); (4) conflicts of policy objectives (short-term vs. long-term); (5)
conflicts of selecting policy instruments (command-control vs. market-oriented); (6)
conflicts of technological choice (costs vs. efficiency), and (7) conflicts of sectoral objectives
(biodiversity vs. climate change vs. industry).
Property rights is one of the institutions under political and economic conditions, from which
various conflicts arise and resolved. The arrows indicate the feedback process, through
which critical messages are taken into consideration in policymaking in order to increase
cost-effectiveness in forest management.
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Figure 1: The Relationship of Pursuing Sustainable Forest Development
Forest Resources
Political and Economic Institutions
Property Rights
Market Forces   Conflicts of Interest
Policy Instruments   Technological Change
Monitoring & Evaluation
Sustainable Forest Management
4.1 Actors and Institutions
In the analysis of the relationship of social institutions that shape global environmental
discourse, we can distinguish three interrelated actors: NGOs, governments (central/local)
and the private sector. Institutions function through means of acting and reacting. Each
institution has its own identity, which defines rules and principles. Institutional identity is
established within social and cultural settings. It can be argued that transfer of knowledge in
decision-making processes, patterns of policy change and innovation, selection of
technologies, and so on, are largely determined by institutional identities.
Table 1 shows the main characteristics of these different social institutions. It is the
interaction, including tensions, between these actors that function as means of retaining
inter-agency relations and promoting co-operation. Formulated governmental policies are
thus the results of conflict resolution as means of harmonizing development process and
achieving perceived objectives. In this regard, adjusting sectoral policies can be viewed as an
instrument for accomplishing commitments, and for resolving conflicts among involved
parties and between groups of actors and institutions.
Institutions function through means of acting and reacting. Each institution has its own
identity, which defines rules and principles. Institutional identity is established within social
and cultural settings. It can be argued that transfer of knowledge in decision-making
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processes, patterns of policy change and innovation, selection of technologies, and so on, are
largely determined by institutional identities.
Table 1: Characteristics of Social Institutions
Environmental NGOs Governments The Private Sector
Characteristics Social Critique Bureaucracy Commercialization
Main Interests Defend Local Interests,
Ideology/User Interests
Engage in Politics
Control of Resources
Retention of Power
Profit Maximization
Market Expansion
Priorities Poverty Reduction
Natural Resource
Conservation
Environmental
Protection
National Economic
Development
National Security
Market Share
Risk Minimization
Instruments Monitoring
Lobbying
Public Debate
Media Reporting
Environmental Impact
Assessment
Negotiation
Financial Control
Political Pressure
Expropriation
Regulation
Incentives
Bidding
Accounting
Cost-benefit Analysis
At the international level, actors can be broadly grouped into three categories: international
agencies, national governments, and NGOs. At the national level, actors can be divided into
six categories: governmental bureaucratic organizations, the scientific community, public-
owned industrial organizations, private sector organizations, environmental protection
agencies, and the non-governmental sector. Different social and cultural identities and
conflicting interests constitute the interactions among these actors, as they are represented
by groups of people from various backgrounds and professional disciplines.
These interactions affect political decision-making processes, within which environmental
policies are formulated and implemented. As a counter-measure to minimize the risks caused
by conventional supply-oriented policies, alternative policies are developed to argue for
programs, such as energy conservation, renewable energy technology development, and
agroforestry.
Networks play a critical role in facilitating communication and co-operation between
organizations. Actors usually interact through a web of networks, formally and informally.
Networking can be understood as an important means of promoting co-operation between
institutions, and of keeping balance in power relations. Through networking activities,
institutions come to share specific knowledge or information, and establish consensus to
reach specific objectives.
To what extent a network can function effectively depends on a number of variables,
including relationships between key actors involved, political interest of individual actors,
design of communication focal points, a common knowledge base. It can be argued that the
ability to build up a reliable and effective network is a decisive factor for cost-effective
management of international aid programs (Gan, 1995, pp.18-21). Establishing network of
institutions is key in implementing environmental agreements, as in other development
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projects and programs. In many cases, conflicts between aid agencies and governmental
organizations lead to ineffectiveness in project management and implementation. In
particular, closer co-operation between international aid agencies and their counterpart
organizations at the national level would facilitate more effective management of joint
programs.
Once policy objectives are established, effective measures are needed in order to use
different policy instruments to achieve expected environmental objectives. There are sets of
options available for choosing policy instruments. Clearly, the performance of environmental
policy depends, to a large extent, upon the adoption of properly defined and constructed
policy instruments.
Policy instruments are inter-linked and interact in a common political, social and cultural
context. How well each policy instrument will function depends not only on internal factors
such as the contents and structure of the instrument, but also on external factors such as
political and social changes in a given circumstance. Moreover, choice of instruments is
largely a result of political determination, despite economic, social and cultural factors.
Environmental management cannot function in isolation. It must be integrated with, or
complemented by, other instruments, such as legal and technical instruments. For instance,
environmental management cannot be effectively undertaken without adequate
environmental information concerning the conditions or trends of environmental quality,
which has to be obtained through environmental monitoring, auditing and assessment. In
other words, environmental objectives cannot be properly met without adequate information
and technical means, such as monitoring and accounting systems and networks.
To analyze the interplay of policy systems, an important factor should be highlighted. That is
the function of a feedback loop from the process of policy implementation to policy
formulation. This feedback function brings signals from different policy implementing
bodies, and public reactions, to the attention of policymaking organizations, which help
correct policy mistakes. Such a mechanism may release some potential social energy to
transform stubborn attitudes and institutions into a self-reinforcing dynamic for change. The
factors that may function in the feedback loop depend in part on the given circumstances of
the country or the party involved.
In principle, local authorities may serve the same objective as promoted by central
governments. However, in reality, local governments may have different motivations and
pursue strategies that may be in conflict with central authorities. There are a number of
problems in mobilizing local governments as feed-back mechanisms and arenas for learning.
One main problem is that local governments may have interests that conflict with various
kinds of reforestation efforts, or have low interest in the effort by themselves. Local
governments may also be involved with particular interests to the extent that they may
obstruct reforestation initiatives, favor particular interests in reforestation process, or thwart
the airing of conflicts during project design process.
The existence of feedback mechanisms at the local level may imply particular advantages for
foreign participants investing in reforestation as joint implementation efforts. In the absence
of such mechanisms, foreign participants may find themselves in a situation characterized by
asymmetrical information, in which central, or local, government has a high level of control
over disseminated information at the local level.
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4.2 Property Rights
There are at least three dimensions of property rights which may influence the cost-
effectiveness of reforestation efforts. First, the degree of conflict between formal property
rights and traditional property rights. Second, long-term security or stability of formal
property rights regimes. Third, distribution of formal property rights. These dimensions
constitute incentives as well as barriers for the long-term interest of various actors in
participating in reforestation efforts and maintaining the sustainability of forests. Conflicts
between formal property rights and traditional property rights have major implications for
local populations’ motivation to participate in reforestation efforts (Westoby, 1989, pp. 56-
64).
Property rights provide incentives or disincentives for different stakeholders, shaping their
behavior over forest resources. In theory, property rights imply the exclusive right to use,
control, and receive benefits from a resource. Randall (1987, p.158) defines four criteria for
a nonattenuated property rights regime:
1. Completely specified: information about the rights that accompany ownership, the
restrictions on those rights and penalties for violation.
2. Exclusivity: the owner shall have the exclusive right to use and to determine use by
others.
3. Transferability: rights must be transferable, so that rights may gravitate to their highest
value.
4. Enforceability: rights must be enforceable and effectively enforced.
In practice, property rights are in most cases circumscribed by the generally accepted rules
of the society. Bromley (1991) identifies four levels of property rights: (1) state owned
property regimes; (2) Private property regimes; (3) common property regimes, i.e., private
property for a group of co-owners; and 4) Non-property regimes ("open access").
From a management point of view, property rights have two important aspects: revenue
collection and resource use. For a renewable resource like forest, the owner receives benefits
if he or she secures the forests’ existence and regeneration. Reforestation, like conservation,
can be forced on local people as confiscation of what they perceive as their own land. As
described later, local people may have property rights systems for land, which is described as
“barren” and “degraded” by environmentalists, and “unproductive” by governments. These
differences in perception of land use constitute an important social dimension in policy
arena.
Confiscating land from local populations, substituting traditional property rights with formal
property rights and putting land into productive use has been a main force in capitalist
development over the last 200 years (Westoby, 1989). The industrial revolution was
preceded by expulsions of local population from the best land, vividly described by Marx.
However, in the British and other European cases, this confiscation was controlled by a very
powerful and stable state in terms of territorial control, the land itself was highly interesting
from an economic point of view, and there was no attention to the welfare of the local
population.
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All of these preconditions are, by and large, absent in present reforestation efforts in Asia.
States, particularly governmental institutions, have limited capacity to intervene in social
relations. This implies that confiscating land for reforestation is seldom a viable strategy, at
least in the long run, which is the time perspective of reforestation. Weak states may make
big investors vulnerable to enduring conflicts with local population, or conflicts between
different governmental institutions. This problem is aggravated by the high risks connected
to reforestation efforts, particularly in the early stage of projects. Tree plantations can easily
be damaged by fire, and fire may be used as a powerful tool for resistance from local
population, as has happened in Indonesia (AFP, news report, Oct.21, 1997).
Even though planted forests may produce high profits in the long run, both initial risks and
investments are high, and they increase as there is no strong state with a capacity to protect
the investment. Furthermore, the social and environmental consequences of displacing local
people may be very negative. If alternative employment opportunities do not exist, local
people may be left with the choice between low-wage work on the plantation, or increased
poverty. In the absence of a strong state being able to guard forest and provide alternative
employment opportunities, parts of the local population may become “shifted cultivators”
and exert pressure on forests.
The second problem, which increases the risks connected to reforestation efforts, is that
formal property rights may be relatively insecure. First, in cases in which the state owns the
land, reforestation profits become more insecure, as the right to harvest the forest in
principle may be withdrawn at any time (Mather, 1990).
Both temporary and full property rights may be insecure in many political systems, due to
high political instability. New rulers may reshuffle property right systems and violate
individual property rights. In cases where the basic rules of the game are so insecure and
there is doubt about the enforcement of contracts, investors may be expected to stay away
from reforestation in the absence of relevant economic incentives. Though high incentives
may attract investors in the short run, the risk of political turmoil followed by confiscation
and conversion of reforested land under a new regime may make reforestation efforts risky
as investments from an environmental point of view.
An option which may imply more positive incentives for reforestation at lower cost may be
to distribute formal property rights to local people in exchange for some kind of
reforestation obligations. In most cases, other incentives for reforestation would also have to
be applied. The amount of complimentary incentives necessary will depend on the alternative
use of land, as well as security of property rights. It may be assumed that secure property
rights and incentives that are higher than the alternative use of land may produce best
environmental outcome.7
Reforestation efforts along these lines may also be less expensive, as local population may
expect much less in terms of profits than large business interests. This is particularly the case
if established traditional property rights are relatively evenly distributed. A complementary
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 The distribution of property rights to rubber tapers in the Amazon region may provide an instructive case.
From the late 1980s, the Brazilian government started to provide property rights to local rubber tapers in
exchange for the right to exploit rubber from wild rubber trees. This system functioned well when the
Brazilian government subsidised rubber prices and prohibited competition from cheap Asian rubber, but it
broke down when import barriers were lifted during the early 1990s. In this period, several rubber tapers
started to convert the forest for agricultural purposes or started small-scale gold mining.
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advantage connected to this solution is that it demands less in terms of governmental
enforcement, as the level of conflict over property rights may be more moderate. A second
advantage is that a more even land distribution may be more beneficial in terms of local
economic development, and motivate less marginalization and pressure on forest by
marginalized local people.
Clearly, reforestation efforts need a stable policy framework over longer periods of time to
become more effective and environmentally desirable. Thus, even though various property
rights regimes may decrease the burden on government in terms of enforcement measures,
all efforts require a long-term commitment by government to become successful in
implementation.
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5 Reforestation in Asia: Comparing China with
Indonesia
A number of studies have investigated carbon sequestration of reforestation programs in the
tropics. Brown (1996) estimates that tropical areas have 80% of the world’s potential for
carbon sequestration in the forest sector. Tropical Asia contributes 34% of this. Latin
America has the largest potential with an estimated 46% of the tropical total.
The total estimated carbon sequestration in the tropics is found to be in the range of 45-72
GtC, more than half of which would be due to promoting natural forest regeneration and
slowing deforestation. Nilsson and Schopfhauser (1995, pp.267-293) estimated that 57.7
million ha could be both suitable and available for carbon sequestration in Asia for the period
1995-2050.8 Of this, 37.8 million ha would be for plantations and 19.9 million ha for
agroforestry.
The immediate carbon sequestration benefit of reforestation is through increasing storage of
carbon and soils in the planted area. Second, reforestation may affect deforestation rates in
natural forests through reducing, or increasing, demand for land. Third, reforestation may
reduce fossil fuel combustion, through the use of fuel woods, instead of fossil fuels, and
timber instead of cement or other energy-intensive materials. The global potential for carbon
offsets is calculated in chapter 24 of IPCC (1996) report.
An analysis based on potential for new growth (plantations, farm forestry, natural
regeneration) and slowed deforestation, was undertaken by Trexler and Haugen (1995).
They estimated that Indonesia is the tropical country (together with Brazil) with the largest
potential for carbon sequestration through sound forest management. Estimates for the
period 1990-2050 range between 5.4 and 14 GtC.
Johnson, et al. (1996) analyzed carbon sequestration in China by using computerized
models. The analysis considered net costs of carbon sequestration from tree planting and
modified forestry practices, whereby the private financial benefits are subtracted from the
costs. Strategies included plantations (intensive, extensive and fuelwood) and improved
management of open forests. Cost-effectiveness was calculated by dividing the net present
value of each respective project by the discounted carbon sequestered in living biomass and
in the soil.
The net cost analysis showed that the least-cost means of sequestering carbon in China is
through intensively managed ’Fast-Growing, High-Yield’ (FGHY) timber plantations, with
internal rates of return above 12% in 10 out of 12 cases, depending on different species
(Johnson, et. al, 1996). Extensive plantations and open forest management were less
attractive, but also low-cost options. Fuelwood plantations, although promoted by the
Chinese government to reduce the adverse impact of fuelwood collection on natural forests
and timber plantations, were found to be financially viable only in southern China, whereas
much of the land available for forestry development is in the north and northwestern regions.
It is noted that at the true market price or opportunity cost of fuelwood, this could be an
economically attractive option.
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 Of the total area in the tropics that is technically suitable for afforestation, only 6% is to be available due
to land use conflicts involving cultural, social and economic constraints (Nilsson and Schopfhauser, 1995).
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The total carbon sequestration potential by plantations in China, including intensively and
extensively managed plantations, fuelwood plantations and open forest management, range
from 2.4-4.6 billion tons of carbon in woody biomass and soil over a thirty-year period, or
an average of 80-153 million tons of carbon per year (Johnson, et al., 1996). Under the high
scenario, carbon sequestration in the year 2020 will be 220 million tons of carbon, about
10% of baseline GHG emissions from China in that year. Since the late 1980s China has
planted trees roughly at the rate of the medium scenario.
One reason for selecting these two countries as a comparative case study is that forests in
China and Indonesia account for 50% of the total forest resources in the Asia/Pacific region.
Reforestation efforts in these two countries will have significant impact on the region as a
whole. It will also have significant implications in terms of mitigating global climate change.
Our focus will be on reforestation of tropical forestry lands. We want to study and compare
regions in these two countries with similar geographic and climate situations, but different
political, economic and institutional settings.
The intention is not only to investigate proper means for public sector involvement, but also
to compare options for private sector participation, especially from industrial sectors. It is
anticipated that great interest from the private sector would be mobilized by national
commitments on CO2 emissions reduction in developed countries, and increasing interest
from developing countries.
Indonesia has remained a high interest in getting involved in JI efforts, while China has so far
been reluctant, or suspicious, in making political commitments on JI/AIJ, although a small JI
project has been implemented with investment from Japan (Harvey and Bush, 1997, p.18).
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that China may become actively involved in JI
efforts in the future, because of its increasing role as a net CO2 emissions contributor, and
potential international pressure for GHG emissions reduction. China’s domestic concerns
with the threat of climate change to its ecosystems will also drive the country toward a pro-
active attitude in its climate change policy.
China has a relatively strong science and technology infrastructure in the forest sector, and
has also established a sophisticated network of forest management nationwide, which
provides a precondition for sound forest management. But past experiences have shown that
China meets a lot of difficulties in keeping its forest resources sustainable. Many
reforestation projects have failed, or not been able to reach expected objectives (Shi, 1992,
p.23). Many blame technical and financial problems involved, but no systematic efforts have
so far been made to analyze the institutional issues for sustainable forest management.
China contributed to 11% of the global CO2 emissions by 1991, and may become the world
largest CO2 emitter early in 21st century (Sinton, et al., 1996, p.VIII-2). Apart from the
increasing domestic demand for forest products, China’s commitment to reduce CO2
emissions and anticipated international pressure could lead to drastic changes in China’s
forest policy to encourage sustainable forest development. The key issue will be how to
mobilize public interest for active involvement in protection of forest resources and
development of new forests. To reach this objective, adjustment of policy frameworks and
instruments would be necessary.
One important factor in forest management in China is the heavy involvement of state-
owned logging companies that are responsible for large-scale loss of forest. Most of forest
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lands are publicly owned by the state. The separation of private ownership from forest lands
puts pressure on forest resources, because of illegal logging and the inability of sustainable
forest management by public institutions. There are increasing private initiatives on
reforestation, due to the encouragement of governmental policies and incentives. By
contrast, private logging companies in Indonesia take the lion’s share in forest operation.
These companies have serious conflicts of interest with local residents. These issues will
make the comparative study interesting, as both countries have different systems of
governance in forest resources.
5.1 Status of the Forest Resources
Table 2 shows the forest resource situation in Asia. China is the single largest developing
country in Asia, where economic reforms have provoked drastic changes in society with
higher demand for consumption of natural resources. These factors have affected the
sustainability of forest resources, and put pressure on world market, i.e., import of wood
products. China’s efforts to stabilize and reduce CO2 emissions will be an important
contribution to the international community because of its intensive use of energy resources,
of which demand for fuelwood is the main contributor to deforestation (about 70%) in rural
areas.
Table 2: Forest Cover in Asia
Country
/Region
Land
area
(1000
ha)
Total
forest,
1995
(1000 ha)
Share of
land area
(%)
Natural
forests
(ha)
Total
change in
forest area,
1990-95
(ha)
Annual
change,
1990-95
(%)
Indonesia 181 157 109 791 60.6 103 666 -5 422 -1.0
China 932 641 133 323 14.3 99 523 -433 -0.1
Tropical
Asia
846 839 279 766 33.0 255 751 -15 275 -1.1
Total Asia 2 676
909
414 172 17.7 n.a. -16 640 -0.7
Source: FAO (1997). n.a.: not available
5.1.1 China
China has a total forest area of some 133 million ha, covering about 14% of the country's
land area and accounting for 28% of Asia's forest area (FAO, 1997; Kunshan, et al., 1997).
Natural forests cover about 99 million hectares or 75% of the total. There is a great variety
of forest types in China, with coniferous forests in the north, deciduous broad-leaved forests
in the temperate zone, evergreen broad-leaved forests in the subtropical zone and rain
forests in the tropical zone. During 1990-1995, China had an estimated annual loss of total
forest cover of about 0.1%. Since 1949 large reforestation campaigns have been
implemented to reduce China's deficit in wood resources. These have not been able to stop
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the decline of natural forests, due to low survival rates of new plantings, high demand for
fuelwood and, especially after 1979, rapid increase in timber logging (Smil, 1993).
Decline of forest cover in China dates back to long before the modern era (Richards, 1990,
pp.169-171; Menzies, 1994). After the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949,
massive reforestation campaigns were implemented. Official sources indicate that total forest
cover increased from 8.6% in 1950 to about 12% in 1980, due to extensive reforestation
programs. However, this figure may be overstated due to incomplete data for 1950 and low
survival rates of the new plantings (Jinchang, et al, 1988; Smil, 1993).
High deforestation rates and massive land degradation are reported after 1949 (Smil, 1987,
1992). Smil (1987, p.219) estimates forest losses of 20 million ha between 1949 and 1980,
almost one-third of which could be attributed to felling of forests for grain fields. According
to the 1990 Forest Resources Assessment by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
China lost on average 400,000 ha of natural forests during the 1980s, but this was offset by
an increase in plantation area of about 1.1 million ha per year (FAO, 1995). Smil (1993)
presents less optimistic figures, reporting a decrease in China’s forest area of 12,8 million ha
or nearly 10% in the 1980s, and wood harvests for all uses 40% above the sustainable rate.
China has a serious deficit in wood resources. Forest resources amount to only 0.1 ha per
capita, less than one-sixth of the world average. China is the third largest consumer of forest
products in the world, and at current rates of exploitation, the stock of commercial forests
will be exhausted within ten years (Johnson, et al., 1996). Per capita consumption of
commercial timber is, however, only 0.05 m3, about one-fortieth of the U.S. per capita
consumption and far below world average consumption of 0.65 m3 (Ross, 1988; Smil,
1993). Major obstacles to increase the domestic supply of wood resources include low
survival rates of new plantings, low productivity, and wasteful wood utilisation (Smil, 1993).
With the implementation of the reform and the open-door policy over the last two decades
there has been a large increase in China’s imports of forest products.
Hainan Island is one of the two major regions of tropical forests in China.9 It was reported
that tropical forest cover in Hainan was 15 million ha in 1950 and it was reduced to 0.3
million ha by 1979, which is only 2% of the original forest area (Shi, 1992, p.23). However,
deforestation estimates vary greatly. Zhongmin and Guangyi (1996) report a loss of about
0.55 million ha of natural tropical forests on Hainan Island between 1950 and 1990. Guangyi
(1995) calculates a mean annual loss of 2% or 34,000 ha from the eve of liberation to the
present, almost two and a half times higher than the above figure. An even higher
deforestation estimate is given by Li (1995), who reports an annual average deforestation
rate of up to 11.5% during 1933-1990, and that only about 8% of the original forest cover
remain.
Several factors have contributed to the decline of natural forests in China. Direct causes
include fuelwood collection and conversion of land to agriculture plots, enhanced by large
population growth. On Hainan Island, Zhongmin and Guangyi (1996) report that more than
30% of the deforestation from 1950 to 1990 could be attributed to slash-and-burn
agriculture. In new plantings, pest infestation represents a major problem, causing economic
losses equalling to the state’s total investment in forestry (Smil, 1993). Other major problems
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 The other is Xishuangbanna in Yunnan Province.
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are inadequate prevention of fires, industrial development (plantation establishment) and
urban expansion.
Underlying this, state policies have had a large influence on forest destruction. After 1949
there was an expansion of agriculture into mountains and marshes. This expansion was given
strong ideological support. "The Great Leap Forward" movement in the late 1950s resulted
in increasing forest destruction and land degradation (Ashton, 1984, pp.613-645)10. A huge
program for iron and steel making required large amounts of charcoal from forests and poor
quality coke from open-cut mines. After "The Great Leap Forward" movement, China
implemented a "grain-first" policy, which called for maximum local self-sufficiency in cereal
production. In many regions extensive conversion of grasslands, bushlands and forests was
the only way to increase grain harvests (Smil, 1987).
5.1.2 Indonesia
Indonesia has about 103 million ha of natural forests (1995), which represents 40% of the
tropical forests in Asia. Other estimates of forested lands in Indonesia in the late 1980s and
1990s range from 92 million ha to 120 million ha (Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 1996).
Estimates for annual deforestation range between 0.2 and 2.4 million ha. A commonly cited
figure for the period 1980-1990 is 1.2 million ha (FAO, 1995), while FAO (1997) estimates
the rate for the years 1990-1995 at 1.0%.11
The forest sector is an important contributor to the Indonesian economy. Indonesia is one of
the world leaders in the export of tropical timber, notably plywood (Sunderlin and
Resosudarmo, 1996). In 1994, wood and wood products produced about US$ 5.5 billion in
export revenue, or about 15% of the total export revenue. Processed wood products are
Indonesia’s second-highest source of foreign exchange after oil and gas. About 700 000
people are employed in the formal forest sector. As the result of the ban on roundwood
timber export in 1985, there has been a rapid development of the processing industry and
pulp production has risen sharply over the last few years.
Deforestation connected to large-scale logging and agricultural expansion on the "Outer
islands", particularly in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Maluku, is the largest source of carbon
dioxide emissions from the country. Deforestation and forest depletion also contribute to
local and regional environmental problems, such as water pollution, soil erosion, and smoke
from annual forest fires. The recent forest fires in Indonesia have damaged large forest areas.
Recent estimates indicate that more than 2 million hectares may have been burned.12 These
incidents reflect the need for sustainable forest management, and for rehabilitation of the
damaged forest areas.
Main direct causes for deforestation in Indonesia include logging, land clearing for
plantation establishment, and slash-and-burn cultivation. Other factors are mining, irrigation
and hydroelectric projects, and urban expansion. Deforestation increased dramatically with
the boom in the logging industry in the mid-1960s, which, to a large extent, was caused by
increasing timber demand from Japan (Brookfield, et al., 1995). Two other major factors for
deforestation are the Transmigration Programme that began in the mid-1970s, and the more
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 cited by Smil (1987).
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 For further discussion on deforestation estimates, see e.g. Angelsen (1997, p.107).
12
 See Pearce, F., New Scientist, 21 March 1998.
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recent expansion of plantations of oil-palm, rubber and timber (Myers, 1991). Over the last
decade there has been a change in view on the causes for tropical deforestation. Slash-and-
burn cultivation is given less of the "blame" for deforestation than was the perception a few
years ago (Sunderlin and Resosudarmo, 1996).13
Problems in government policies and institutions have been considered the underlying causes
of deforestation in Indonesia. This includes policies and institutions both within and outside
the forest sector. Gillis (1988:43) states that deforestation in Indonesia "would have been
less rapid had government policies had more neutral effects on tropical forest land use
decisions". It is clear that poverty is a major driving force for the destructive forms of slash-
and-burn cultivation. Examples within the forest sector are short logging concession periods
and weak enforcement of regeneration regulations, land use or ownership rights that are
obtained by clearing of lands, and subsidies for plantation establishment on natural forest
lands. Examples of non-forest policies affecting forest management are resettlement
(transmigration) schemes, general tax and agro-conversion policies, fuel subsidies, and
exchange rate policies (Gillis, 1988).14
Despite uncertain figures, there is little doubt that given the current trends, a large part of
the natural forests in Indonesia will disappear within a few decades. It is also clear that a
certain level of deforestation is unavoidable in the development process in Indonesia. Myers
(1991) estimated that "planned deforestation" (and thus desired by the government) in
Indonesia, comprising timber concession areas, forest areas allocated for conversion to
agriculture, and spontaneous settlers, could eliminate 20 million ha during the 1990s. Even
in cases where forest clearing could be desirable, the use of fire for clearing has disastrous
consequences when at a scale observed in the fall of 1997.
5.2 Reforestation Programs
5.2.1 China
Large afforestation programs were implemented in China after 1949. According to the
Forestry Yearbook of China (Kunshan, et al., 1997, p.27), the area of afforestation
undertaken annually by the State since 1949 has ranged between 27,400 ha (1950) to 6,022
million ha in 1994. FAO (1995) estimates the 1990 plantation forest area at 31.8 million
ha.15 Kunshan, et al. (op.cit.) reports that the plantation area in 1994 was 34.3 million ha.
Jiankun, et al. (1996, pp.249-253) estimate that man-made forests will cover about 40
million ha in the year 2000. Plantations have been established to secure the supply of forest
products, to combat desertification, to rehabilitate degraded lands, and to reclaim desert
lands into new farmland.
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 In Indonesia, the official view seems to have undergone changes, but a remaining problem is that the
government does not distinguish between "traditional" and "modern" forms of slash-and-burn cultivation. It
is well documented that traditional slash-and-burn cultivation, given the abundance of lands and low
population density, is an ecologically sound practice. Traditional practices are often called shifting
cultivation to separate it from the destructive sides of the practice seen in areas with high population
pressure and scarcity of land areas. (See New Scientist, November 15, 1997).
14
 For more discussion on this issue, see also Angelsen (1997).
15
 This is similar to Jiankun, et al. (1996), which report the 1990 figure to be 30.7 million ha of man-made
forests in China. No source is given for this number.
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Past efforts for afforestation have only led to partial success, and many projects failed as a
result of low survival rates or low productivity, due to lack of proper care after plantation,
and conflicts of institutional objectives. The Ministry of Forestry has stated that no more
than one-third of all China’s plantings since 1949 have managed to survive. Jinchang, et al.
(1988) reports an overall survival rate of only 30% since 1950. A survey by the Northwest
Institute of Forestry in Xian from the 1980s, cited by Smil (1992), indicated that "half of
reported national afforestation claims were false, and that the survival rate of planted trees
was no higher than 40%."
It has been argued that disincentives in pricing, management and marketing have hampered
expansion of forest resources. One problem concerns ownership and management: "Lacking
both direct ownership and management influence over standing timber, state forest industry
units had few incentives to facilitate regeneration" (Jinchang, et al., op.cit, p.214). Another
major problem has been disincentives in the pricing system. The planned prices were set too
low to reflect real costs. Retail prices remained constant from 1955 to 1972. Even in 1979,
prices in China were 50% lower than in the world market. This gave growers too little
incentives to invest in forestry, the industry too little incentives for efficient utilisation, and
resulted in wasteful consumption patterns. Narrow price differentiation with species, quality
and size worked in the same direction.
China has set up an ambitious plan for afforestation as reflected in the “China Cross-Century
Green Engineering Plan”. By the year 2000, 57 million hectares of forests will be planted
through afforestation and reforestation projects. Therefore, potentials for afforestation under
JI are high, particularly with private sector participation. In order to reduce China's deficit in
forest products, several policy changes have been implemented. Changes are seen in pricing
systems for woods and wood products (Jinchang, et al., 1988), and land use policy (China
News Digest, April 29, 1998).
China has large plans for increasing both quantity and quality of the forest resources. The
government's goal is to expand forest cover to 15% of its land base by the year 2000.
According to Kunshan, et al. (1997), total afforestable land in China now amounts to 63
million hectares, of which 14.1 million ha are suitable for timber plantations. Fast-growth
and high-yield plantations (FGHY) are set up as a priority.
The afforestation program for the FGHY afforestation program was initiated in the mid-
1980s. According to Johnson, et al. (1996) more than a quarter of the plantations established
in China since 1985 has been FGHY. Plantation establishment is planned to serve several
purposes. For example, it is stated that "wild land and wasteland will be eliminated in 21
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities by 2000, in the whole country at large by
2100" (Kunshan, et al., 1997, p.25).
5.2.2 Indonesia
Afforestation programs in Indonesia have been called reforestation if on government land
and regreening if on private lands (Gillis, 1988). A variety of such programs have been going
on since independence in 1946. Today, governmental interests are increasing, as natural
forest resources have become scarce. Increasing efforts are put into government
afforestation schemes, primarily for securing the timber industry with raw material.
One government program being conducted to attract private investors is the Industrial
Timber Estates (HTI). HTI was established in the early 1980s to promote reforestation of
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degraded lands (including compensating for the failure of logging concessionaires to secure
regeneration after logging), and to ensure an adequate long-term supply of raw materials for
the domestic wood processing industry (MoF and FAO, 1990).
Priority areas for HTI plantations are the vast areas of human-induced Imperata grasslands,
resulting from deforestation followed by frequent burning. Invasions of Imperata cylindrica
(alang-alang) or other infestive weeds often hamper regrowth of forest after heavy logging
or land clearing in Indonesia. In Indonesia alone, large-scale Imperata grasslands cover at
least 8,6 million hectares (Dalfelt et al., 1996). To promote reforestation of such lands, a set
of financial incentives is offered to potential investors, funded by royalties from the logging
concessions.
As with other rehabilitation programs, HTI has so far not been very successful, neither in
attracting private investors nor in securing the maintenance of planted areas. Implementation
of the afforestation programs has been hampered by factors such as technical difficulties,
lack of local manpower and social resistance (Dalfelt et al., 1996). Institutional conflicts
have also created inadequate conditions for efforts to eliminate deforestation. For example,
inadequate property rights may lead to conflicts between local residents and large
companies. It has been suggested that huge reforestation incentives motivate large forest
companies to clear-cut their forest concessions in order to become eligible for reforestation
funds (AFP, Oct.21, 1997).
This implies that even if the technical difficulties related to reforestation were resolved, there
might be serious institutional barriers connected to the use of reforestation as a JI measure.
The problems connected to traditional property rights as well as the abundance of internal
Indonesian funds for reforestation are special challenges. The weakness of the policy
framework for sustainable forest management both at the local and national levels also
creates obstacles for project implementation.
5.3 Property Rights
5.3.1 China
Ross (1988, p.82) analyzed three forms of ownership management in China’s forest sector:
state (bureaucratic-administrative), collective (campaign-exhortation), and private (market-
exchange). It is concluded that "each form has advantages and drawbacks related to
common property resource management, incentives, and free-rider effects". However, while
both state and collective ownership in principle had several advantages over private
ownership (planning, economies of scale, favoured access to investment, and highly skilled
work force), the author states that the advantages proved illusory in practice.
Private forestry was virtually eliminated in the 1950s, but several changes occurred due to
the economic reform promoted by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s (Jinchang, et al., 1988;
Ross, 1988). In 1978, two new forms of private forestry systems were introduced: extension
of private plots to forestry and development of the contract responsibility system. Private
farm plots had earlier been a rather constant part of the rural economy, but had not been
common in forestry. In addition to the general bias towards collective ownership of natural
resources, the authorities viewed privatisation and small-scale operations to be incompatible
with sound forest management. Changes in policy were, according to Ross (1988), due to
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dissatisfaction with the slow pace of collective afforestation and high costs of state forestry.
"As in farming, the collective retained land ownership, but households were granted the right
to cultivate the land for their own needs or, within limits, to market the products" (Ross,
1988, p.69). Forestry lands consisted of sloped wastelands and were distributed on an equal
per capita basis.
The private plots were the lesser of the two forms of privatisation introduced in 1978 (Ross,
1988). In the contract responsibility system, the collective community (usually at the village
level) also retains ownership but contracts with households/workers to manage the lands
over a period of 15-20 years or for the expected life of a stand. In return, contractors receive
some proportion of income from the forests or woodlots and rights to other income and
commodities produced with the land.
By establishing a direct link between responsibilities, rights and rewards, it was hoped that
households would acquire a strong, direct interest in developing forestry. Ross (1988, p.83)
reported problems with overcutting and disputes over property rights, but "the reformers
argue that they are due to the traumas of policy transition and uncertainty over the stability
of the new policies". Johnson, et al. (1996) notes that "the quality of management by
collectives and individuals is generally low, since they have had limited access to advanced
silvicultural techniques and since most face financial constraints." It is further stated that
"(…) household forest farms continue to be characterised by low productivity and minimal
adaptation of improved silviculture techniques."
Ross (1988, p.84) concludes that "a regime whose policy is more profit oriented and based
on incentives is likely to benefit not only timber production but also conservation". The
author adds, however, that "for improvements to occur (…) the state must provide
improved infrastructural supports, [including] continued political stability; a greater pool of
capital for investment credits (…); assured access to grain for areas specializing in forestry,
including subsidies where necessary; higher producer prices and freer markets; improved
technical services; fire and pest protection; crop insurance (…); and security against
rapacious local governments that threaten to tax the profit out of forestry".
In the 1980s, roughly a quarter of the total forested lands was transferred from the state to
the households as part of the household responsibility system (Johnson, et al., 1996).
Jinchang, et al. (1988) reports that by 1985, households were conducting over 50 percent of
an expanding volume of afforestation around China. In the arid Northwest region,
households were assuming responsibility for soil conservation measures, receiving subsidies
for implementation of unprofitable efforts. After 1978, there have also been increasing
efforts in demarcation and enforcement of property rights. Before 1978, non-enforceable
rights "greatly impeded forestry development". Rights are inheritable and can, to a limited
extent, be sold or transferred among individuals. Currently, 45.3% of the forest resources in
China are under State ownership, with the rest under collective ownership. Among the area
of "economic forests", collective ownership dominates (90%), but the stock volume is
largest on state lands (70% of standing stock volume). (Kunshan, et al., 1997).
5.3.2 Indonesia
The Indonesian government has property rights to all natural forests through provisions in
the Constitution of 1946. Rights may be transferred to private, individuals or corporations,
either temporarily for 20 to 25 years as with timber concessions, or irrevocably to
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transmigration families (Gillis, 1988). The Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) in 1960 deals with
regulations of ownership, utilisation and reservation of land, water, air, and associated
natural resources. Commonly cited areas of disincentives for forest management in Indonesia
include the following: conflicts between formal and traditional rights, enforcement problems,
problems with the concession/policy regulations per se, and disagreements among
government agencies.
The formal ownership arrangement has given rise to conflicts with local populations, who
arrange their land use according to customary laws. These are "unwritten, customary rules
of the indigenous population" (GOI/IIED, 1985). Much of the forest land in the Outer
Islands, although perhaps not forested, has not yet been demarcated and is still managed
under local Adat law16 (GOI/IIED, 1985). The general perception on traditional land rights
by Indonesian authorities is that they have faded away and are no longer relevant (Evers,
1995). Only traditional land rights that were formally declared before the BAL of 1960 are
accepted. Conflicts arise when lands are distributed to plantation/logging companies or
transmigration programmes.
Even if traditional rights are recognised in theory, they are in practice overridden and little or
no compensation is given to farmers losing lands (Lohmann, 1996; Sedjo, 1987; Dalfelt, et
al., 1996). Even large-scale grasslands, officially described as "unused wastelands" often
have some sort of traditional rights connected to them. Putting fire to plantations on these
lands has been one way of showing social protest.
In Indonesia, differing aims of government agencies have had negative consequences. There
are at least six government departments that directly affect tropical forest utilisation in
Indonesia. Gillis (1988) notes that "[c]oordination of policy toward forest utilization
between the six departments has been virtually absent until recent years, and sporadic at best
since then". The author argues that the narrow views of each of these departments have had
destructive consequences. Especially the protective functions of the forests have been
neglected. The Forestry Department has focused on the extraction of wood resources, the
Transmigration and Public Works Department tends to see forests as a place for relocating
transmigrants, the Department of Industry as a source of raw materials for plywood mills,
and so forth.
The lack of enforcement of forest regulations in Indonesia presents another constraint.
Logging or plantation companies may undertake activities outside their concession area, they
may not pay logging rents and taxes, and they commonly do not regenerate forests after
logging, as prescribed in the concession agreements. Companies may also undertake logging
or establish plantations within areas where local communities have the formally accepted
property rights, or within protected areas. Lohmann (1996) reports that Department of
Forestry admits that as much as 86% of concession holders violate government logging
rules. Government agencies have too low capacity to restrict slash-and-burn cultivation in
protected forest areas. Logging and plantation companies are also involved in complex
patron-client networks with the government, leading to a de facto acceptance of regulation
violations.
The laws and regulations themselves also give disincentives in terms of forest management.
For example, as land clearing in many cases is a way for small holders to obtain and maintain
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their land use rights, land conversion is encouraged. For logging areas, concession periods of
20-30 years are generally regarded as being far too short (and the extension procedures too
insecure) to give long-term management incentives. Perhaps worse, however, is that large
subsidies are given to companies that want to establish plantations in logged over forest
areas. Newly logged forest areas are much more attractive for plantation establishment than,
for example, large-scale grasslands, because of aggressive weeds, low soil fertility, and high
fire frequency of the latter. One company can in this way obtain high profits through logging
concessions, and later obtain large subsidies to clear lands and establish plantations
(Lohmann, 1996).
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6 Conclusions
To promote reforestation in developing countries requires a better understanding of the
institutional conditions that shape the development and implementation of JI projects. The
paper stresses the need for studies on the institutional conflicts and barriers to
implementation of JI projects on reforestation. As far as carbon sequestration is concerned in
international climate negotiations, developing cost-effective mechanisms that fit into local
circumstances for joint implementation is of particular importance.
This paper highlights the importance of research on reforestation in Asia, with particular
emphasis on property rights regimes and its relationship to joint implementation and
concerned social groups and institutions. It points out the interrelationship of
implementation mechanisms, methodologies and criteria for project development, and the
roles of various stakeholders in project implementation, with China and Indonesia as two
illustrative and comparative cases.
We see property rights as a critical dynamic factor in affecting the attitudes and active
participation of local people and communities in the operation of JI projects. In the process
of investigating property rights mechanisms, we consider the relationship of environmental
NGOs, governments and the private sector as an important steering mechanism in setting up
cost-effective property rights regimes. This relationship is conditioned by a number of
variables: characteristics, interests, priorities, and instruments of involved parties.
China and Indonesia have large potentials for reforestation. Their future participation at the
JI/AIJ scheme would have large impact at the forest sector as well as in their socio-
economic systems. The past experiences of reforestation projects in China and Indonesia
indicate the need for proper policy intervention before any investment decision is made and
implemented. The following issues are considered important for future research:
(1) Conflicts among stakeholders: There often exist conflicts of interest between various
stakeholders with regard to reforestation activities. Differences between formal property
rights and local (traditional) property rights are a common source of conflicts in
afforestation projects, e.g., between logging/plantation companies and farmers/local
communities.17 Conflicts arise when traditional rights are not legally recognized by
government, and local communities do not receive any form of compensation for loss of
lands to plantations.
(2) Long-term security or stability of property rights regimes: A well-known problem in
promoting reforestation projects is the capacity of institutions to secure property rights.
Even if land-use conflicts are resolved, weak or politically unstable states often give little
long-term security for property rights, and consequently few incentives for private
investment in land-use. In this situation, investors face higher risks in reforestation
projects, due to uncertainty in return of investment.
(3) Distribution of property rights: reforestation projects could be more effectively
implemented if property rights are distributed to local communities. Arguments are that
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 For example, in Indonesia, it is known that even large-scale grasslands, which are officially considered as
“empty wastelands”, there are well established, informal land tenure arrangements (Turvey, 1994; Van
Noordwijk, et al., 1995).
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level of conflicts would be lower, it would require less enforcement, it would be
beneficial in terms of economic development, and it could lead to more ecologically
diverse reforestation strategies. It is unclear, however, how external factors for carbon
sequestration would affect distribution of property rights.18
(4) Information exchange: sufficient information exchange and effective use of information
to adapt to experiences are key requirements for any management system to succeed.
This means that inefficiencies are discovered and necessary changes are put into practice.
It is our suggestion that the social and human dimensions in design and implementation of
JI/AIJ projects and programs have, to a large extent, been ignored. This is not surprising, as
social scientists have generally been slow in responding to global climate change research
(Gan, 1995, pp.7-11). In particular, they have not made substantial contributions to research
on JI/AIJ, due to the complex nature of the problems involved in host developing countries.
It is also by no means clear about private sector’s involvement in JI/AIJ activities and how
closer co-operation could be made between parties and local participants. This is partly
because of the uncertainties in policy incentives provided by host developing countries.
Qualification of institutional conditions for JI/AIJ at host countries would be a great
challenge for researchers.
It is reasonable to ask in what ways cost-effective mechanisms can be established and
implemented in host countries, which can generate pro-active responses from local
communities and relevant stakeholders. Moreover, adequate methodologies and criteria for
designing, monitoring and evaluating projects need to be formulated. Financial and legal
mechanisms that meet local circumstances and particular needs, and at the same time satisfy
the interests and objectives of national governments, international aid agencies, and private
investors, should also be established.
Our main hypothesis is that institutional aspects represent a missing linkage in climate
change mitigation studies with relation to the forest sector. Institutions shape development
trajectories, and the lack of focus on this aspect has several implications for design and
implementation of projects. This in turn may give unexpected and unwanted - yet largely
unknown - overall effects. The following questions are considered important in formulating
and directing future research:
(1) What are the underlying institutional conditions that affect the design and
implementation of reforestation programs?
(2) Who are the main actors involved in forest management, and which are their respective
roles and motivations?
(3) To what extent and in what ways do property rights affect the cost-effectiveness of
reforestation efforts?
(4) What policy instruments can be developed or improved to facilitate reforestation
programs?
(5) What are the relevant institutional frameworks and/or arrangements to be used in JI for
reforestation programs? And what institutional changes would be brought up through
such programs?
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 It is reasonable to expect that e.g. plantation companies would use climate change mitigation benefits to
promote their own interests in acquiring land areas.
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It is our wish that a new research agenda can be established and implemented, through which
a better understanding of the institutional roles in shaping reforestation projects/programs in
developing countries can be achieved. For doing so, interests from the scientific community
and support from funding agencies for such an initiative are needed.
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Appendix: Definition of Terms
Institutions
By institutions, we refer to the security and distribution of property rights on various user
groups, rules for acquiring land for reforestation, and the magnitude and structure of other
reforestation incentives.  Institutions also include channels for response and criticism from
local populations and environmental NGOs to the government agencies that regulate and
coordinate reforestation efforts.
Institutions can be seen as elements that constitute the relationship among individuals and
groups in society. Oran Young (1989a) defines institutions as “Social practices consisting of
easily recognised roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing relations
among the occupants of these roles. The rules that link institutionalised roles and, therefore,
form the superstructure of institutions ordinarily encompass sets of rights or entitlement as
well as behavioural prescriptions.” In our study, institutions refer to security and distribution
of property rights, rules for acquiring land for reforestation, magnitude and structure of
reforestation incentives, and channels for response and criticism from local people and
environmental NGOs to government agencies. To a larger extent, laws and regulations over
property rights are determinants in practice in land use.
Afforestation and Reforestation
Afforestation is here used as the establishment of forests on non-forested lands, regardless of
whether these lands have ever been covered by forests or not. Reforestation is used when
lands have been cleared in recent times, while rehabilitation refers to a situation with
degraded environmental conditions. Turvey (1994, p.52) defines afforestation as "the
process of planting trees to improve soil fertility, community well-being and wealth, and
maintaining or improving biodiversity of the landscape." Afforestation may also be applied to
cases where natural regeneration, and not plantation, is the most efficient way to establish
forests. Planting trees could be implemented in a variety of ways, from monoculture forest
plantations to highly diverse and complex agroforestry systems. In this study, we use
reforestation as a broader term to cover all the above mentioned aspects.
Carbon Sequestration
The term carbon sequestration describes the process of carbon uptake and storage. This
refers to carbon dioxide (CO2) uptake through photosynthesis and storage of carbon in
vegetation, soils, and wood products. However, indirect effects on carbon emissions, e.g.,
on deforestation rates and combustion of fossil fuels, should also be accounted for.
In contrast to temperate and boreal, the largest share of carbon in forests tropical forests is
stored in above-ground biomass. Below ground, carbon occurs as living root biomass, in
humus or in the soil mineral component.
Forests absorb CO2 through the photosynthesis and store carbon in biomass. CO2 is released
through decomposition of organic material. In tropical forests, as opposed to temperate and
boreal forests, the largest share of carbon is found in above-ground biomass. Below ground,
carbon occurs as living root biomass, in humus or in the soil mineral component.
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Growing forests have net absorption of CO2, while mature natural forests are regarded as
being in a steady state, i.e., that uptake through photosynthesis equals releases through
respiration. A recent study from the Amazon basin indicates, however, that year-to-year
variations in the carbon fluxes may be larger than earlier thought (Grace, et al, 1995,
pp.778-780).
Joint Implementation (JI) and Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ)
"Joint Implementation" refers to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC), which states that "Parties may implement (…) policies and
measures jointly with other Parties". The principle implies that countries with high emission
reduction costs (typically industrialised countries) may invest in greenhouse gas (GHG)
reduction efforts in low-cost countries (typically developing countries), thereby obtaining
credits for achieved emissions reductions.
There is considerable discussion both about JI as an implementation mechanism and its
applicability to afforestation and reforestation in tropical countries. Under the FCCC
negotiations, a pilot phase for JI efforts is now in progress (1995-1999). These efforts are
referred to as Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ). AIJ projects in the forest sector are
being implemented in countries, such as Costa Rica, Mexico, and Indonesia. The future
development of JI will, to a larger extent, depend on the experiences from the pilot phase.
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